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An old Mandarin proverb on China states, "If you think you 
understand, you don't really understand." That warning also sums 
up the challenges that face Americans in dealing with this fasci-
nating part of the world. 
When viewed separately, each of the many aspects of policy 
involving China-economic, political, military, and environmen-
tal-is difficult but perhaps manageable with reasonably tough de-
cision making. However, taken together, we can begin to see the 
complicated interrelationships. For example, more open flows of 
trade and investment are likely to generate a higher living stan-
dard in China-and also enhance its ability to expand its military 
establishment and thus increase political tensions. Moreover, 
higher levels of output are likely to generate more environmental 
. pollution. 
The challenge of reconciling these factors becomes even more 
overwhelming when we introduce the possibility of significant 
change in the economic outlook China is facing. However daunt-
ing that task, we must attempt it. 
Economic Relations 
Let us begin with one of the more measurable clusters of U.S.-
China relationships-the economic. First of all, any way we look at 
it, China is becoming an important economic power, once again. 
Using a form of comparing natural economies known as purchas-
ing power parity (PPP), the Chinese economy is now more than half 
as large as that of the United States and larger than Japan's. 
China is a major trading partner of the United States. More 
than $60 billion of commerce flows each year between the two na-
tions. But the term "partner" is a euphemism for a very uneven 
set of commercial flows. The United States imports from China 
more than four times the dollar amount of our exports to them. 
This relationship is far more out of balance than our trade with 
Japan. Yet, unlike the case of Japan, most of the opposition to 
continuing normal trading relationships with China does not arise 
from those who believe they are hurt by the large excess of im-
ports. Rather, it emanates from groups concerned with noneco-
nomic factors, notably the harsh treatment of religious minorities, 
political dissidents, and Tibetans. 
Aside from low-priced clothing, toys, and electronic parts, trade 
with China is not a significant portion of the American economy. 
However, the United States is the destination of almost one-third 
of China's exports. Our commerce is a key way in which that na-
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non acquires technology. Our trade also generates a substantial 
part of China's large accumulation of foreign exchange. 
The Chinese economy has been growing on average at double-
digit rates for the two decades since Deng Xiaoping began his liberal-
ization effort. However, a similarly optimistic forecast for the next 
two decades is not realistic. An array of economic, political, social, 
and cultural barriers face China's continued rapid development. 
So far, China has emerged relatively unscathed from the fi-
nancial problems besetting East Asia, but that is more report than 
forecast. China's estimated 1998 expansion rate of 5 to 7 percent, 
although lower than recent years, continues its position as the 
Asian growth leader. Some signs of weakness are visible, notably 
sluggish exports and stagnant industrial production. 
What would be the impact of a major slowdown in the still rap-
idly rising Chinese economy? Let us assume that China's gross 
domestic product in the coming decade no longer grows at 10 per-
cent a year, but at half that rate. Five percent is still respectable 
by the standard of the more mature Western economies, which 
average half of that. 
The impacts of such a scenario are likely to be negative for 
the American economy, but uneven and limited. Our exports to 
China, modest to begin with, would rise more slowly than they now 
do. A few sectors would be affected, mainly machinery and equip-
ment, chemicals, aircraft, electronics, and agricultural products. 
Not much change would occur at first in their exports to us. Our 
trade deficit with China would rise only a bit, but enough to exacer-
bate what to Americans is already a contentious issue of domestic 
policy. The larger trade deficit also would reduce the chances of 
Congress approving "fast track" and granting more U.S. funding to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The positions taken by American business would hardly be 
uniform. Companies that export to or invest in China would con-
tinue to support open trade. However, those hit by competition 
from low cost imports of consumer products have not been fans of 
improved Sino-American relations, nor are their employees or ad-
jacent communities. 
A rising trade deficit with China would generate more support 
for the market-opening moves on the part of China that official policy 
in Washington continually promotes. Yet, these trade talks would be 
heating up just when the Chinese saw their economy weakening. 
They would be less motivated to respond in a positive manner. 
Nevertheless, serious institutional barriers to a more balanced 
flow of U.S.-China commerce deserve the attention of both govern-
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ments. In contrast to the open U.S. market, numerous obstacles 
face American exporters to China, such as onerous licensing pro-
cedures. Compulsory registration applies to about 400 products, 
typically electrical products and machinery. Moreover, U.S. pro-
ducers of computer software, video tapes, compact discs, books, and 
motion pictures suffer because their products are frequently cop-
ied illegally in China. This intellectual piracy reduces potential 
U.S. exports to China and to the rest of the world by about $2 billion 
a year. "Piracy," it should be noted, is a Western concept and not 
an Asian one. 
A slowdown in China's growth will alter adversely the expecta-
tions of U.S. and other Western investors. Surely there would be 
less support for the unrestrained enthusiasm of the late Ron Brown, 
then Secretary of Commerce: "China .. .is the pot at the end of the 
rainbow." Many corporate investors would reevaluate their China 
commitments, especially those whose rosy profit expectations had 
not been achieved. 
A slowdown in China's growth will alter adversely the 
expectations ofU. S. and other Western 
investors .... Many corporate investors would reevaluate 
their China commitments, especially those whose rosy 
profit expectations had not been achieved. 
A recent survey of 96 multinationals operating in China re-
ported that 62 percent had overestimated the market potential and 
an almost equal number (61 percent) had experienced poorer profit 
performance than they had expected. Those percentages do leave 
room for some outstanding successes. Procter & Gamble domi-
nates the market for soaps and shampoos. Coca-Cola far outsells 
Hainan coconut juice, and Ken-de-ji is well known in the largest 
cities (that's Kentucky Fried Chicken to Westerners). 
A reduced inflow of new foreign capital would worsen the slow-
down in the overall Chinese economy. China, however, is unlikely 
to accept passively a major reduction in its economic growth. It 
says it needs to expand 8 percent a year to maintain social stability 
and to continue its ambitious reforms to force state-owned enter-
prises to meet market competition. 
Beijing already has announced a massive infrastructure con-
struction program, of $750 billion or more. That action could be 
3 
counterproductive if it crowds out private and local investments. 
To some extent, China can rely on an expansionary monetary policy 
to boost domestic demand. Yet, if pushed too far, this type of policy 
could renew inflationary pressures, which would worsen its already 
difficult competitive position in East Asia. 
Should China respond to its economic difficulties with a sub-
stantial devaluation of its currency, such a destabilizing event would 
reverberate across East Asia. The United States likely would be 
drawn in, either as a direct source of financing or via the IMF. In 
an increasingly global economy, the fates of China and the United 
States have become intertwined. A sharp and sustained decline in 
China's growth rate would not be good news for Americans. 
Political Relations 
The political relationships between China and the United 
States are even more difficult to fathom than the economic. Presi-
dent Clinton describes the current state of Sino-American ties as 
"a strategic partnership." Yet few aspects of a true partnership are 
present. It is Japan that cooperates with us in a variety of impor-
tant foreign policy activities, including financing a considerable 
portion of the Gulf War. We also share a common outlook toward 
democracy, private enterprise, and personal freedom. 
On the other hand, there is no direct basis for confrontation 
between China and the United States. We do not share a common 
border nor do we hold competing claims for territory. However, sig-
nificant differences in fundamental values are clearly visible in 
terms of the treatment of citizens by the government, especially in 
regard to personal freedoms-political, economic, and religious. 
The limited amount of individual liberty available in China 
galls many Americans. Especially upsetting is the persecution of 
Christian groups and the jailing of political dissidents. It is diffi-
cult for the United States to accept the idea of a "partnership" with 
a nation that engages in such offensive practices. 
On the positive side, in recent years China has relaxed the 
rules governing everyday life for the typical citizen. A substantial 
decentralization of power has taken place and greater latitude has 
been provided to private enterprise. The impacts of Western culture 
and commerce have been pervasive, especially in the larger cities. 
U.S. corporations doing business in China serve to advance 
our human rights goals. They create safer workplaces, follow more 
progressive personnel practices, raise living standards, and bring 
in new ideas, attitudes, and ways of thinking. American compa-
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nies, such as Mattei, have adopted codes of conduct requiring local 
subcontractors and suppliers to avoid child labor and other prac-
tices inconsistent with U.S. standards. More indirectly, commer-
cial products and advertising carry a powerful implicit message of 
personal choice. 
Substantial portions of the population recognize such Ameri-
can brand names as Coca Cola, Jeep, Head and Shoulders, Marlboro, 
Mickey Mouse, and Kodak. Young women wear miniskirts and use 
Western-style makeup. 
U.S. corporations doing business in China serve to 
advance our human rights goals. 
A major slowdown in the Chinese economy could interrupt 
the limited trend toward liberalization, and perhaps even reverse 
it. A weaker economy would strengthen the position of old-line 
communists. Because Western investment has been accompa-
nied by Western culture and attitudes, a diminished presence by 
American business would reduce the prospects for China eventu-
ally moving to a more open political system. 
Military Relations 
The military area generates great uncertainty for American 
policymakers. China is in the midst of a major effort to upgrade its 
military capability. The acquisition from Russia of destroyers with 
supersonic missiles is a cogent example. 
Is China motivated by the desire for regional hegemony? Its 
highhanded treatment of other nations in some of the islands in 
the South China Sea certainly worries them at times. The 1996 
episode of China's missile testing in the Taiwan Straits raised ten-
sions in the region. 
On the other hand, the current weapon procurement effort 
may be defensive in nature. China's military capability is rudi-
mentary compared to the United States. Its troops are poorly 
equipped by our standards, and their weapons, in the main, are 
considered to be obsolete. The Gulf War demonstrated that such 
large stockpiles of outdated equipment are of little use against a 
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more advanced opponent. Moreover, China lacks the ability to project 
its power over water in any substantial way. It possesses a total of 
57 surface ships and 7 modern submarines. Thus, China presents 
little direct military threat to the United States, but it could be a 
substantial destabilizing force in East Asia. 
Financed by its economic growth, China is procuring more 
sophisticated aircraft, ships, and missiles. Over the past decade, it 
has acquired some high-tech equipment from the cash-strapped 
countries of the former Soviet Union. 
At present, there seems to be little potential for extensive 
military action outside of an unintentional blunder into armed con-
flict. Taiwan quickly comes to mind in this connection. China's 
desire for a strong military establishment may be understandable 
when viewed in the light of its long history of defeat and exploita-
tion by foreign aggressors. Yet, over the centuries it has played 
that role itself in Southeast Asia. 
{A] slowdown in China's economic development might 
reduce one important potential for military confrontation. 
It would ease the pressure to secure additional energy 
sources .... the South China Sea would present less of a 
potential military jlashpoint than is the current outlook. 
It is not clear how an economic slowdown would affect the 
Chinese military establishment. Economic growth enables Beijing 
to invest in technological modernization. Such financing might be 
curtailed in a weaker economy. Yet, rising unemployment could 
generate severe social and political pressures on the Beijing re-
gime. Diverting public attention from internal problems via an 
international incident involving military action surely has histori-
cal precedent. 
China's extreme dependence on its domestic coal supply for 
energy also could generate serious problems. The vast and still 
mainly untapped oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea are 
an important potential alternate source of energy supply for China. 
Overlapping portions of that strategic area are also claimed by Viet-
nam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Furthermore, 
all ocean shipping among those six countries, as well as the trans-
port of oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan, takes place across the 
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South China Sea. 
Thus, indirectly, a slowdown in China's economic development 
might reduce one important potential for military confrontation. It 
would ease the pressure to secure additional energy sources. Un-
der such circumstances, the South China Sea would present less 
of a potential military flashpoint than is the current outlook. 
Environmental Issues 
Environmental issues are a relatively new aspect of interna-
tional relations, and one in which American and Chinese inter-
ests could readily collide. The December 1997 meeting in Kyoto on 
global climate change yielded a proposed treaty that would commit 
the United States to a major reduction in emissions of carbon diox-
ide (C02), which are generated primarily by using fossil fuels. The 
treaty, which requires Senate approval, would effectively exempt 
China and other developing nations from its tough restrictions. 
That generates serious political difficulties in the United States. 
Last fall, the Senate pledged to defeat any climate change treaty 
that did not include the developing nations. Reconciling the Sen-
ate position with the Kyoto agreement will focus heavily on the role 
of China, a prime emitter of C02 • 
The bright side of a slowdown in its economy is that it 
would dampen-but not eliminate-the now sharply 
upward trend in China's energy consumption 
Poor countries like China believe that they cannot afford to 
sacrifice current income to avoid the uncertain costs of environ-
mental damage 50 or 100 years from now. Even though air pollu-
tion is a visibly serious problem (coal generates 75 percent of its 
energy), China considers use of scarce resources for ecological 
purposes to be a rich country's luxury. Thus, trying to convince 
that nation to limit its energy consumption while the major West-
ern countries use 5 to 10 times as much per person will probably 
prove futile-unless wealthier countries such as the United States 
pay the global costs of reducing fossil fuel usage. 
The bright side of a slowdown in its economy is that it would 
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dampen-but not eliminate-the now sharply upward trend in 
China's energy consumption, and hence in its generation of C02 
and other global warming emissions. 
In the longer term, there is an important negative side to any 
extended slowdown in China's development. When countries reach 
per capita income of about $10,000 a year, they begin to take a 
more active role in environmental improvement-because they 
believe they can afford to. A curtailment of China's growth would 
delay the achievement of that happy condition. Its per capita in-
come now is less than $5,000. 
Reconciling Divergent Interests 
When asked the meaning of the French Revolution, Zhou Enlai 
was supposed to have replied, "It is too soon to tell." In this vein, it 
is with some reluctance that I will try to pull together the various 
strands of Sino-American connections. Policymakers in both the 
United States and China face fundamental challenges in attempt-
ing to deal simultaneously with a host of contentious economic, 
political, social, religious, military, and environmental issues. Not 
all of these serious matters can be solved soon. It would be sen-
sible to focus on the highest priorities. 
A useful starting point is to note that China's isolation is end-
ing. Today it is more open to the influences of Western culture and 
business practices than ever before. Its senior officials say they 
want their country to be a full participant in the world economy. 
They acknowledge that this requires China to move to a market 
economy and to modernize its society. Yet China is not a member 
of key international organizations, formal and informal, such as 
the WTO and the annual economic summits. 
The United States is in a special position to aid China in its 
entry into that "club." After all, we are one of the newer members. 
We also have a major stake in China's success in its effort to move 
out of its isolationist setting. As a key Pacific power, it is to our 
benefit to encourage the rise of a China that interacts regularly 
with and is at peace with its neighbors. 
China and the United States are complementary in terms of 
their basic economic needs and resources. We are China's lead-
ing export market as well as the most logical partner to help up-
grade its technology through investment and joint venturing. In 
turn, China is the most promising new market for American busi-
ness and agriculture. 
China's huge development and infrastructure needs can pro-
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vide enormous export and investment opportunities for U.S. com-
panies seeking geographic diversification. In the important area 
of higher education, U.S. colleges and universities are a popular 
place for wealthier Chinese to send their children, especially for 
graduate education. Such activity has the added potential of gen-
erating personal and intellectual bridges between the two nations. 
However, China's distance from the West is greater than a 
glance at the globe suggests. Central differences exist in histori-
cal experience, cultural orientation, and political and social insti-
tutions. The rule of law is still essentially a foreign concept. Viewed 
in this light, let us see how we can deal with the main issues that 
will either separate our two powerful nations or bring them closer. 
China and the United States are complementary in 
terms of their basic economic needs and resources. We 
are China's leading export market ... China is the most 
promising new market for American business and 
agriculture. 
It may be surprising for an economist to start with military 
rather than economic issues, but matters of war and peace are 
fundamental. The continued expansion of China's military power 
should be acknowledged as potentially destabilizing. However, the 
sensible response is not to try to talk Beijing out of what it thinks 
is a reasonable position. 
Instead, we should simply but clearly note that, in terms of 
our vital interests, the expansion of China's armed strength pro-
vides a compelling justification for the maintenance of a substan-
tial U.S. military presence in East Asia. The United States 
maintains security alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Philip-
pines, Thailand, and Australia. Yet a China that is secure from 
foreign threat and can protect its legitimate sovereignty is desir-
able for both Asian and American vital interests. On the other 
hand, coercive pressure by China against its neighbors in the South 
China Sea or against Taiwan only serves to escalate tensions in 
East Asia. 
Anyone who follows domestic political trends in the United 
States knows that strong pressure exists for devoting an increas-
9 
ing share of the federal budget to domestic matters. Our willing-
ness to assign a significant amount of our military resources to 
East Asia reflects the high priority that we give to stable relations 
in that region. 
In the area of economic policy, the United States remains the 
main bulwark of free flows of commerce and capital across the globe. 
Nevertheless, because we are a democracy, we respond to the con-
cerns of our citizens as expressed in the political process. Thus , 
when Chinese officials dismiss these concerns as "just domestic 
politics," they demonstrate that they do not yet understand how a 
democracy works. 
It is unrealistic for China to expect that we can maintain a 
fully open market in the face of the following combination of ad-
verse factors: (1) a host of barriers to U.S. exports to China, (2) 
severe restraints on the operations of U.S. firms in China, (3) lack 
of a functioning legal system that provides local citizens as well as 
foreigners with essential protection of individual liberty and prop-
erty, and (4) overt discrimination against and persecution of people 
that many Americans identify with. 
In developing closer relations with China, trade-offs are 
inevitable .... Our government must balance concern for 
human rights against other important interests which 
also have significant moral aspects -such as peace, 
national security, and prosperity of our citizens. 
Nevertheless, it is counterproductive for us to try to tell China 
what to do under those circumstances. It is most appropriate for 
the United States to clearly explain our position, motivation, and 
actions. We sincerely hope that China continues to open up its 
economy and to achieve more of the freedoms to which the citizens 
of other advanced societies have grown accustomed. 
However, if it chooses not to take these enlightened positions, 
China will postpone the time when it gains full membership in the 
global marketplace and the family of modern societies. Clearly our 
preference is to welcome China into that desirable relationship 
sooner rather than later. 
In developing closer relations with China, trade-offs are in-
evitable . While private organizations emphasizing single issues 
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are free to take absolutist positions, it is foolish for governments to 
do so. Our government must balance concern for human rights 
against other important interests which also have significant moral 
aspects-such as peace, national security, and prosperity of our 
citizens. 
The United States maintains peaceful and friendly relations 
with many nations that do not share our fundamental beliefs. But 
those relationships are not nearly as strong or as enduring. A vir-
tuous circle is possible. Closer economic and individual ties in 
turn can lead to improved mutual understanding-and vice versa. 
Thus, we should welcome the development of improved relations 
with China and further progress in the day-to-day interactions of 
our citizens, but we should be prepared for less happy outcomes. 
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